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Abstract: Need—National legislative health and safety (H&S) frameworks impose requirements but
grant self-management to organisations. Consequently variability arises in management systems,
and some organisations struggle to achieve successful implementation. The risk assessment process
is key to the H&S management system, and could benefit from greater consistency and better external
alignment with the legislative framework of the jurisdiction. Approach—The harm categories in the
New Zealand (NZ) Act were adapted into a consequence scale. A non-linear scale was developed for
the consequence axis to represent the disproportional nature of catastrophic harm outcomes compared
to minor injuries. A hazard assessment process was devised based on systems engineering methods.
Organisational decision-criteria were derived from the communications requirement in the Act,
and these thresholds linked to expected treatments. Originality—A method is providing for aligning
risk assessments with a national legislative framework, and integrating the technical aspects of risk
assessment with the management processes. The approach also more explicitly includes recovery
actions in contrast to existing methods where prevention dominates. Regarding the management
aspects, it shows how thresholds may be defined relative to the legislation, to give clear expectations
regarding treatment and internal communication, thereby assisting executives (‘officers’ in terms of
the NZ Act) meet their duties.
Keywords: legal duty; organisational behavior; external alignment
1. Introduction
The assessment of occupational health and safety (OSH) hazards, as commonly applied in the
workplace, typically comprises the tabular evaluation of consequences and their likelihoods, for various
risks. The resulting table of hazards and the solutions (which are variously called treatments, remedies,
or mitigation) is called a risk register. Optionally, it may also include residual risks, i.e., a reassessment
of the risk assuming the proposed treatments are effective.
Risks are possible future events that might happen, and in the safety context they are invariably
negative. The term ‘risk’ has variable usage, and can either mean the possibility of an event, or the
combination of consequences and the likelihood of those consequences.
More generally, risks have the potential to give rise to future consequences, which may be negative
(threats or hazards) or (positive) opportunities, and this is the perspective taken by the risk management
standard ISO 31000 [1]. The risk assessment used in health and safety (H&S) is a simplified version of
risk assessment that only looks at the threat component.
In the H&S application the assessment is consistent with the ISO 31000 approach of partitioning
the risk into consequence and likelihood, i.e., those are considered orthogonal. The processes are:
identify risks, analyse risks; evaluate risks (quantitative and qualitative methods are available); and
treat risks. Those who are interested in a fuller discussion of the treatment of risk, including other
options that may be useful at design-time, are referred to the risk management literature. Suitable
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starting points for risk management generally are ISO 31000 [1], HB436 [2], and for technology risks in
particular AS3931 [3] or the equivalent international standards.
However there are a number of problems with the risk assessment approach as applied to H&S.
The methods tend not to be aligned to the legislative framework of the jurisdiction, at least in New
Zealand (NZ) which is the region under examination. Furthermore, there is no consistency in practice
regarding the scales used in the risk assessments. What follows relates specifically to the NZ situation,
though some of the principles are believed to have wider applicability.
2. Background to Health and Safety Legislation in NZ
2.1. Health and Safety Legislation in NZ
In the NZ case, the relevant legislation is the Health and Safety at Work Act (2015) [4]. As the date
shows, the Act is relatively recent. Moreover, it introduced a radically different legislative intent towards
safety. The initiating event for the change in legislation was the Pike River mine catastrophe [5]. The
resulting investigation into the mining catastrophe [6] identified multiple weaknesses in the legislative
landscape prevailing at the time of the accident. For one, the legislation obligated organisations to
eliminate/minimise/isolate hazards for their staff. The NZ approach to H&S was, and still is, consistent
with the principle that legislation should ‘stipulate the duties of those with primary responsibility for
OSH measures in general terms, rather than to attempt to regulate a multitude of hazards in minute
detail [7]. A legislative system comprises regulations in addition to laws, and the mining industry
operated under considerable self-regulation. The mine company had the freedom to make decisions
with significant adverse safety implications. For example: they proceeded to put the main ventilation
fan inside the mine itself, despite the misgivings of the mine inspector [6]; they defined for themselves
a ‘non-restricted’ zone within the gassy coal seam, where they placed electrical apparatus, and made
this decision based on engineering convenience [5]. The investigation found no evidence of any risk
assessment prior to placing the electrical services in the coal [6]. The safety systems were ad hoc, staff
from subcontractor firms were in the mine, sometimes with inadequate or no safety induction: “Its
health and safety systems were inadequate” [6]. Hence the self-management of H&S was ineffective
and safety was compromised.
It was possible for executives to avoid the legislative duties if they could show, as in this case, that
they were uninformed about risks: “the board of directors did not ensure that health and safety was
being properly managed and the executive managers did not properly assess [this]” [6], despite the
numerous prior warning signs that methane was regularly at explosive levels. Fundamentally, the
managers did not manage the risks competently.
Consequently, the law was changed, resulting in the current act [4], which placed a much greater
duty of care on executive officers (‘officers’) to inform themselves of H&S risks and resource the
treatments. It also changed the definition of workers to include anyone at the workplace, irrespective
of their employment contract or remuneration. It also created a joint responsibility for H&S for all
organisations that had workers at the workplace, as opposed to partitioning the duty. The NZ act
created a requirement on executives to show due diligence for H&S in a way complementary to their
fiduciary duties under the company act. (For a wider analysis of the effect of catastrophes on the
improvement of process safety, see [8]).
2.2. Intent of Legislative Frameworks for Self-Management—The International Context
The intent of legislative frameworks is that organisations implement ‘voluntary arrangements
to strengthen compliance with regulations and standards leading to continual improvement in OSH
performance’ [9]. In practice, this means that organisations are left to develop their own H&S
management systems, as evident in ISO 45001 and the ILO standards [10]. (For a comparison of the
prescriptive vs. flexible approach to legislation see [11]).
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However, to some extent that appears to be a naive premise. As evident in the Pike River mine
disaster, even in developed countries the self-management can fail [6]. A similar observation has been
made about the Canadian mining sector specifically the need for audit [12], and for inspection in the
United States dam sector [13].
There is also a case to be made that smaller organisations, and organisations in developing
nations, struggle to successfully implement self-management. Organisations with less access to
professional resources may find it difficult to create such systems. There is evidence from Nigeria that
the lack of specificity in H&S legislation adversely affects construction safety [14,15]. Weaknesses in
clarity and structure have also been identified in the United Kingdom H&S law [16]. Likewise, the
Australian experience has been that small and medium enterprises have difficulties in developing
specific workplace practices from the abstract and non-prescriptive legislation [17]. Results from Italy
also show that smaller firms are less effective than larger ones at reducing accident rates [18]. Likewise,
the Malaysian experience has been that H&S management systems are often difficult to implement to a
level that meets the legislation [19]. This has also been found to be the experience in Malawi [20]. It
would appear that developing countries generally struggle to develop the systems necessary to give
effect to legislative objectives. Presumably, part of this is the lesser availability of H&S expertise to
smaller firms, which was specifically identified as the case in Ghana [21]. Related to this is the need to
actively develop a professional body of health and safety experts, and even in developed nations this
is something that requires deliberate work and support [22].
The case has been made that flexibility in H&S legislation creates greater liability risk in the
aviation sector, and that organisations are tempted to respond to this by suppressing the internal
reporting of safety risks [23]. Hence, the quality of safety reporting becomes a key determinant in
the effectiveness of H&S management systems. The older NZ legislation created just such a perverse
incentive for executives to maintain their ignorance of risks within their organisations. There can
be other perverse gaps between that which the law intends and what organisations implement. In
Australia, there are greater H&S responsibilities for larger construction projects, where size is measured
in financial terms, but there is evidence that the monetary threshold is not ideal, e.g., contracts may
split to avoid the requirements [24].
2.3. Challenges to Management Systems
Many engineering projects involve multinational collaboration, and workforces of diverse cultural
origins. Challenges to H&S management systems have been observed in large construction projects
with multinational labour in the United Kingdom, relating to work practices, communication, and
culture [25].
There are other shared areas where nations operate but without sovereign jurisdiction, and there
is a need for coordination of safety. Historically the international ocean has been this domain, to
which can now be added Earth orbit and other planets. Safety is one of many considerations in the
legislative framework that is evolving for space, currently in an ad-hoc manner [26]. New technologies
are another area where common understanding of risks and how to assess them can be valuable,
nanotechnology being an example [27].
Food safety is a more down to Earth application for risk assessment [28], and the global
interconnectedness of the supply chain means that working towards commonality of these safety
processes is advantageous. Again small firms are more at risk, e.g., in China [29]. Better coordination
of risk assessment processes and documentation between subcontractors, especially the inclusiveness
thereof, has been identified as necessary in the chemical industry [30].
Another area where a common understanding of risk is needed is mental health and psychosocial
risk [31]. While mental health is specifically included in some H&S legislation, NZ being an example, the
methods for assessing and managing this are only weakly developed if at all. Harmonisation of policy
across jurisdictions has been found to have positive effects on psychosocial health in Australia,
Safety 2019, 5, 59 4 of 24
with non-harmonised jurisdictions showing reduced communication efficacy and management
commitment [32].
2.4. Need for More Systematic Methods
The international expectation is that risk assessment should comply with the regulations of the
jurisdiction (International Labour Organisation) [9]. The ISO 45001 standard for Occupational health
and safety management systems likewise identifies the central need for organisations to have processes
to identify hazards (Section 6.1.2.1) and assess risks (Section 6.1.2.2) [33]. These documents identify
multiple factors to be taken into account. In ISO 45001, these include organisational culture, human
factors, history of incidents, emergency situations, other people exposed to the hazard, etc. There is
much about internal alignment, the development of an H&S management system that takes into account
how the organisation conducts its operations. The concept that organisations may also need to ensure
external alignment with the national legislative framework is weakly developed in all these documents,
and absent regarding risk assessment in particular. Instead each organisation develops its own H&S
management system and tools, including risk assessment methods.
There is a need for more systematic methods for use as elements within an H&S management
system. It is apparent from the literature that there exist many organisations, especially smaller
ones and those in developing nations, which lack resources to create management systems ab initio.
Furthermore, there is a need to strengthen the communication mechanisms between those doing the
risk assessments, and the managers who have the financial budget to support treatment.
Key to this is the need to anticipate, identify, and evaluate hazards and risks [9]. This is central
to the operation of a safety and health management system within an organisation [33]. If the risk
assessment are not being done, or done to a lower level of rigour, or not being communicated to
managers, then treatments may not be resourced and continual improvement fails. Effective use of risk
assessment processes showed positive benefits in Finland [34] and a positive correlation with specific
preventative treatments [35]. (For a general background to the Finnish H&S legal systems see [36]).
2.5. Standardised Methods
Standardised safety management methods provide organisations with some assurance against
liability. Liability in H&S arises even if the law does not change, because of the development of
precedents [37], which invalidate treatments that once were deemed sufficient. Hence there is a need
for methods that evaluate compliance, and some recent developments have emerged in that direction
(e.g., [38,39]).
When the legislative framework changes abruptly, as in NZ, then there is a methodological shock
that propagates through industry, as they seek to understand the new implications for their operations,
and realign with those requirements. It is to be expected that the release of ISO 45001 may cause
nations to review their laws, in which case this type of readjustment may become more common: there
is some evidence that readjustment is already the case in Romania [40].
2.6. Specific Needs for New Zealand
In the case of NZ the Act implicitly expects practitioners to conduct hazard assessments, but does
not specify the methods. Instead the methods are provided in guidance documents and examples
provided by the regulator (Worksafe). These show a semi-qualitative risk-assessment method whereby
qualitative estimates of consequence and likelihood are converted to ordered scales. In one publication,
Worksafe proposed the use of simple linear scales for consequence and likelihood, e.g.,:
‘Insignificant—no injuries,
Moderate—first aid and/or medical treatment,
Major—extensive injuries,
Catastrophic—fatalities’ [41].
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These scales are simple linear ones to which numbers are allocated (typically ranging from 1 to 5).
Of itself, this is not necessarily an issue, because there are often insufficient data on which to make a
more precise determination. Also, the method is intended to be applied by workers and team-leaders,
or at least comprehended by them, hence a simple system is advantageous.
Another example of the type of scale in widespread use in NZ is:
1. Minor
2. Moderate—first aid required
3. Serious harm occurs
4. Major harm—permanent injury
5. Death—loss of life
Note the variability in the definition of major harm in the two examples above. One defines it as
extensive injuries, the other as permanent injury. It will be appreciated that these are not the same thing,
and the extent and severity of these injuries is not specified. Furthermore, neither construct appears in
the NZ legislation, hence the external alignment is also missing.
The universal premise of ordered scales is that the increments between the categories are of equal
value, but this is not validated. Such scales suffer from methodological invalidity when used in a
subsequent mathematical product operation with a similarly constructed likelihood scale, which is
invariably how they are used. The issue is the ordinal scale is subsequently being used as an integer
one. The reasons why this is problematic are apparent when considering the intervals between the
categories. In effect the scale asserts that death is five times worse than a minor incident (such as a
scratch that needs a sticking plaster), and that death is another 25% worse than major harm. These are
naïve assumptions that do not stand up to scrutiny, however one looks at them. If one applied the
perspective of economic rationalism, the cost of a sticking plaster is a few cents, and the financial value
of a human life (there are multiple measures) is in the order of a hundred thousand dollars, which is
certainly not a 1:5 ratio. Furthermore the death of one person might be a random accident, but the
death of many in a catastrophe implies a serious failure of the of H&S management system and may
attract fines and punitive consequences beyond the mere proportional increase in the number of deaths.
If instead one applied a medical rehabilitation lens, one could measure the diminished quality of life
caused by various levels of harm. Quality of life scales do exist, e.g., WHODAS (which measures a
person’s ability to function in matters of living) [42], and have been applied experimentally to the risk
assessment process [43], but do not support simplistic 1 . . . 5 consequence scales. Such scales fail to
recognise the non-linear effect of catastrophic accidents.
Providing an organisation uses the same scales throughout, it should result in a consistent
measurement of risk. However there is a lack of consistency between organisations—each uses its
own scale constructs. Consequently, the same hazards may be assessed differently, and hence given
different treatment priorities, between organisations. This is where the problem arises, because H&S
legislation tends to make the best practices the standard, and hence organisations may find that they
expose themselves to legislative risk.
The regulations define a ‘prescribed risk management process’ [44], but this is merely the need to
identify hazards and apply the hierarchy of hazard control. The actual risk assessment process is not
prescribed, and the process goes straight from identifying hazards to treatment without mentioning
the types of risk assessment processes that would ordinarily be understood from ISO 31000.
Furthermore the scales are primarily focussed on preventative activities. Indeed that is the
perspective taken by the NZ regulator, in common with many other jurisdictions. Thus the prevention
of a hazard by elimination or minimisation is the primary objective. This is evident in the hierarchy of
hazard treatment which Worksafe uses, for which they use the term ‘hierarchy of control measures’ [44].
That the focus is prevention is evident in the term ‘control’ and by scrutiny of the diagram. The
concept of recovery mechanisms, to prevent a small accident propagating into a larger catastrophe,
is absent (except perhaps tacitly). Worksafe do identify catastrophic hazards, but their definition of
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‘low frequency, high consequence (e.g., major industrial, workplace or transport incidents such as a
large explosion’ [45] is focussed on accidents that occur immediately, and ignores the progressive and
cascade failures where opportunities to prevent propagation are missed.
For example, the Pike River Mine recorded excessively high methane levels in the days and hours
preceding the disaster, which were definitive indicators that the methane risk was out of control. Yet,
management ignored that information and continued mining operations that would release further
methane. They had previously experienced occasional small localised explosions of methane that
were minor and which did not propagate to full conflagrations. The thermodynamic explosion of
the mine occurred on 19 November 2010, but the causal path to disaster commenced months before.
The real H&S violation at Pike was not so much the final explosion, but the failure to apply recovery
mechanisms earlier when it was apparent from the methane readings that the preventative hierarchy
of control had failed.
Where catastrophic outcomes can reasonably be foreseen, it is irresponsible to rely only on
prevention: thought needs also to be given to recovery. The hazard assessment method is primarily
a preventative method, at least in the way it is commonly applied, and is poor at eliciting disaster
recovery actions. The bowtie method is much better at soliciting recovery actions that may prevent an
accident propagating into a wider disaster. Some of that thinking needs to be included in the H&S
risk assessments.
Another issue is that the risk assessment scales bear no resemblance to the definitions in the NZ
H&S legislation. This is particularly true of the consequence scale, where legislation may have specific
definitions for types of harm, but these are not always carried through to the scales. Consequently there
can be a mismatch between the risk assessment scales used by an organisation, and the expectations of
legislation. The Act uses a coarse definition of harm, which is notifiable incident, notifiable accident,
and death. There are much finer grades of harm that exist, which are important for hazard analysis.
Furthermore, the hazard assessments tend to be ad hoc. The list of risks in the register tends
to be in the order in which they were thought up, without a system. Worksafe itself offers no very
systematic method for hazard identification [44–46]. Obviously systematic methods do exist, e.g.,
fault tree analysis, but these seem not to be used. Presumably this is because the purpose of hazard
assessments is that they be done by workers rather than safety specialists.
A further deficiency of many hazard assessments is the lack of connectedness of the organisational
decision making. The Act created a legal duty for executives to ensure they keep themselves informed
of risks. Executives are personally liable if they fail in this duty. In this way, the Act explicitly removed
the previous defence of ignorance that was widely used by executives. Hence, there is a need to be
more explicit about the thresholds where knowledge of risk is escalated. Existing methods appear not
to have a coherent communication strategy and hence executives, at least in NZ and other nations that
adopt similar legislation, are potentially exposed to significant personal risk. There is a need for a
better way to communicate about risk.
3. Method
3.1. Purpose
The premise of this paper is that there is potential value to society in being more systematic
about H&S management systems. The risk assessment is identified as the key component of an
organisational H&S management system. It is suggested that useful improvements would be (a) better
alignment to the legislative framework of the jurisdiction (‘external alignment’), (b) standardisation
of process, especially regarding the scales used. From the perspective of communication theory, the
risk assessment might be considered a type of boundary object: an artefact that is passed between
people and helps them make sense of the discussion in which they are involved. Hence improving this
document has the potential to improve the communication and decision processes.
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External alignment is potentially valuable in helping an organisation fulfil its legal obligations,
and better understand its exposure to liabilities. It also has the benefit of creating coherent safety
terminology throughout organisations, which has the potential to improve communication about risks.
Standardisation of process allows risks to be assessed in consistent ways. This is potentially
valuable in giving organisations confidence that their risk assessment process will stand up to external
examination. Hence this may reduce liability. It also has the potential to allow risks to be assessed
in ways that may be compared across organisations. This may assist benchmarking, and develop
a common understanding of risks within industries. Furthermore, standardised processes could
potentially be of significant benefit to small organisations and those in developing nations, as they
could be provide core components of an H&S management system that could be quickly implemented
in a resource-scarce environment.
It is therefore suggested that, in principle, it should be possible to use systems theory to create a
basic H&S management system from a set of coherently interacting standardised modules. These could
be easier to implement in under-resourced organisations than the customised monolithic systems that
well-resourced organisations can afford to implement. The risk assessment process is identified as the
key module, and is the focus of the current paper.
Desirable attributes are:
• Provide an instrument which has a clear and unambiguous definition for the various legal
categories of harm. This is necessary for consistency of application.
• Accommodate the particular definitions of harm used in the jurisdiction (NZ in this case).
• Accommodate health considerations (chronic, long-term harm).
• Accommodate the non-linearity of catastrophic harm incidents.
• Accommodate the fact that the Act’s legal penalties and liabilities increase disproportionately
with the scale.
• Define clear expectations regarding treatment. In contrast existing methods leave this to each
organisation to set, without guidance.
• Integrate preventative and recovery treatments, by providing a means whereby both may be
brought to mind. In contrast existing methods focus overly on prevention at the expense
of recovery.
• Offer a systematic way to structure the hazard assessment without overburdening it with the need
for specialised knowledge.
The present paper offers solutions towards some of these objectives.
3.2. Approach
The approach was to take the harm categories in the Act, and include them explicitly in the
consequence scale. As only a few such categories are defined in the Act, it was necessary to interpolate
additional categories.
Next, a non-linear quantitative scale was developed for the consequence axis. This, it is proposed,
more adequately represents the disproportional nature of serious harm outcomes compared to minor
injuries. Also, the scale was extended to include a new category of catastrophe (multiple deaths). This
was introduced to elicit disaster recovery actions.
A hazard assessment process was then devised. This is consistent with ISO 31000 [1], but frames
the process in a way to encourage (a) systematic consideration of risks, and (b) disaster recovery. Basic
principles of system engineering are introduced, by suggesting that hazard analysis is preceded by
sketching/describing the system architecture. Several specific methods are offered.
Also, the process recommends that the current state of the technical system be described, especially
the existing controls/barriers/procedures that are in place. In this way some of the key thinking behind
the bowtie and barrier methods is introduced, without additional burden.
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We then considered the organisational decision-criteria. This relates to the legal duty for executives
(‘officers’ in the wording of the Act) to ensure they are kept informed of risks. A set of thresholds
were devised. These thresholds were represented both quantitatively (numerical thresholds of risk)
and qualitatively (colour regions on a risk map). These thresholds were then linked to the level of
treatment response expected. For example the more severe risks could be expected to involve alerting
executives, and have treatment in both prevention and recovery plans. We adopted the typically
organisational structure used in NZ, which is Board, chief executive officer (CEO), Technical manager,
and Team leader.
4. Results
4.1. A Harm to NZ Legislation
The NZ Health and Safety at Work Act (2015) replaced the concept of ‘serious harm’ with that of
‘notifiable injury or illness’ [4]. In this context, notification means towards the regulator, which is a
government agency called Worksafe. The definition of notifiable injury or illness is given in Section 23
of the Act, and includes serious types of injury, chemical exposure, or infection necessitating medical
treatment. Some types of serious injury are specifically delineated, such as amputation, head injury,
eye injury, burns, spinal injury, unconsciousness, and lacerations. Accidental Death is also a notifiable
event. The Act was written such that other injury or illness could be added to the list by simple
declaration via regulation (as opposed to changing the Act). Accidents that merely require first aid are
not considered serious harm or notifiable incidents, unless other factors are involved like zoonoses.
Then the Act defined a second category around near-accidents, and called this ‘Notifiable incident’.
An incident is when something happened that could have had serious consequences. Generally, and
historically, a near-miss had been considered in a somewhat positivist manner. However, the 2015 Act
deliberately forced organisations to be more attentive to near accidents. In the New Zealand context,
it is important to note that a notifiable incident is one where a person was exposed to serious harm,
whether or not serious harm actually occurred. The mere fact that the systems failed to the extent that
someone could have been seriously hurt is sufficient.
Specifically, the NZ Act identifies a notifiable incident as an ‘unplanned or uncontrolled incident
in relation to a workplace that exposes a worker or any other person to a serious risk to that person’s
health or safety arising from an immediate or imminent exposure to [list]’ (Section 24). The list includes
chemical leakage, fire, electric shock, structural collapse (multiple types are listed), vessel collision.
Provision is made for others to be defined later by regulation.
As this shows, there are two major types of risk in the Act. Yet, as described above, these are not
represented in the risk assessment scales. Hence it is necessary to construct a scale that accommodates
these two items, and also includes the finer graduations needed for assessment purposes.
The proposed harm scale is:
1. Hazard present but existing controls prevent progression (hazard is controlled by existing
treatments and if it materialises the effects are expected to be inconsequential)
2. Incident occurs with no harm (near-accident)
3. Incident occurs and Minor harm results
4. Incident occurs and exposure to serious harm but no actual harm (‘notifiable incident’)
5. Serious harm Occurs (‘notifiable injury or illnesses)
8. Death
10. Catastrophe (recovery systems fail, multiple deaths occur)
It follows the harm categories in the Act, and provides finer categories. It has other features, by
design. It emphasises the perspectives of ‘existing controls’, and ‘recovery systems’. It introduces
‘catastrophe’ as an extreme outcome. It proposes a non-linear quantitative scale, to solve the problem
of existing scales where death is often merely one notch above losing a finger.
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Furthermore, the scale may be supplemented by recommended actions and legal responsibilities.
The full scale is shown in Table 1. The actions shown here are suggestions from the author, and have
no formal standing.









Periodically check the efficacy of
existing controls. Be alert to the
possibility that the addition of new
hardware or changed routines
may add new hazards. Repeat the
hazard assessment periodically.
Be aware of the hazards:
ignorance is an offence in
its own right.
2 Incident occurs with noharm (near-accident)
Collect incident reports, review
them, and look for trends. Are
some risks increasing? Are you




Make sure that a system
exists for reporting
incidents and that it is
actually used, as lack of
systems is an offense.
3 Incident occurs andMinor harm results As above As above
4
Incident occurs and
exposure to serious harm
but no actual harm
(‘notifiable incident’)
Something slipped: what was it?
Interestingly this is just as much
notifiable as when serious harm
does occur.
The organisation has to
report the event to the
regulator ‘immediately’
(s51) [4], preserve the site
for inspection until
authorised by an
inspector (s53), and keep











Often organisations are slow to
recognise the problem, unwilling
to admit that a mistake has
happened, and tardy in calling for
help. Their risk treatment is
focussed on prevention, and their
limited emergency plans are
overwhelmed when catastrophe
occurs. They may be paralysed by
incapacitation, indecision, or
denial as the disaster unfolds.
Better recovery systems are
needed, but may be difficult to
improvise at the time. The fact
that catastrophe occurred
indicates that the barriers were
overwhelmed and the recovery
systems failed. Why?
There is also inconsistency between organisations regarding the likelihood scale. A quantitative
scale based on empirical evidence is best, but is seldom available, so the likelihood scale may
be qualitative.
The following likelihood scale is adapted from SAA/SNZ HB436 Risk management guidelines [2]:
6. Almost certain






Note that it is the likelihood of the harm occurring, i.e., takes into account the efficacy of any
existing treatment mechanisms, not the likelihood of the root cause arising. The more protective
systems already in place, the lower the likelihood of harm. This is why it is important at the scope
definition to be clear about what the current state of the system is.
4.2. Identification of System Architecture
We propose that risk assessments would benefit from a more explicit categorisation of the threats.
If a risk is not identified and included at the early stage, then it will not be included in subsequent
analysis and treatment. Creating a system architecture has several potential benefits: It is a check
on how well the analyst understands the complexities in the situation. It provides a means to check
whether the scope has been covered. Hazards may be inferred directly from the system architecture.
It provides an artefact (boundary object) with which to communicate with the rest of the organisation.
We suggest using flowcharts, diagrams, or system representations of the process. Typical
categorisations in the work place might be:
1. Workplace Location: The work may be done by different people in separate physical locations.
For example a company printing a newspaper has different risks for the reporters, pre-print layup,
printing engineers, and delivery people.
2. Zones: Another type of location is where there are different technical systems in different physical
zones, irrespective of whether there are people there or not. For example, an aircraft fuselage has
a cockpit, galley, passenger seating zone, cargo hold, toilets, and avionics bays. Each of these
have different types of hazards. A specialised form of this is called Zonal Analysis.
3. Hardware Sub-System or Type of Equipment: This is similar to above except the analysis is for
each piece of plant or equipment. An example is a construction site, and the analysis could be by
the type of machine: excavator, roller, dump truck, laser based surveying equipment, etc.
4. Task: In this case, a worker is performing multiple different types of task. For example, a garden
service worker could be mowing lawns (dust, cuts), trimming hedges (hand injury, eyes),
spreading compost (Legionnaires disease), or lifting and loading (back injury).
5. Work-Flow: In most manufacturing plants, there is a sequence of operating procedures that
determine the work-flow. In which case, the hazard would be determined for each stage in the
work-flow. For example, in an injection moulding firm there are hazards involved with lifting
plastic granules into hoppers (falls, working at height dust), heating and drying of feedstock
(fire), injection moulding (burns, fluid lancing by blast of hydraulic oil, slipping on floors, fumes,
fire), part removal from press (burns, crushing), or deburring (cuts, contact dermatitis, repetitive
strain injury).
4.3. Decision Criteria
Using the above scales, we identified by inspection of typical outcomes, which the risk
thresholds are approximately: 30 or higher—Unacceptable risk; 18 or higher—Urgent treatment;
8 or higher—Consider treatment; 7 or less—No intervention necessary. These thresholds are specific to
the scales for harm and likelihood, and would need to be adjusted if the scales changed.
Executives or the board may like to be involved with this as they are personal liable for
organisational risk appetite. Is it acceptable or not for a certain number of minor harm injuries to occur?
These thresholds can also be represented in a qualitative form on the risk map, see Figure 1. We
have designed it such that the qualitative and quantitative methods give consistent analysis outcomes.
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thresholds have been determined subjectively. If this system was to be implemented in an organisation
it is recommended that Table 2 be adapted as needed, and then Figure 1 changed accordingly.
Table 2. Decision thresholds with actions and reporting expectations. Colours correspond also to
regions on the risk map (see Figure 1).
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4.4. Treatment Options
For H&S, the usual treatment options are elimination–isolation–minimisation. This is the
conventional hierarchy of hazard control. Elimination is for the engineer to design the hazard out of
the system. If that is not practicable, then minimisation is the next solution. Use of personal protective
equipment (PPE) is considered the solution of last resort, not the first or only solution.
However, these are only preventative actions. Preventative mechanisms (proactive barriers)
prevent the threat from arising or progressing to an incident. We propose that it is also necessary, for the
more serious injuries, to consider the recovery mechanisms. Recovery mechanisms (reactive barriers)
prevent the undesired state from progressing to further catastrophe. They recover the situation, by
breaking the consequential chain. They reduce either the severity of the consequence, or the likelihood
of further harm, e.g., emergency response plans.
The latter include recovery actions taken by trained staff (e.g., pilots able to belly-land an aircraft),
reserve capability of technical systems (e.g., aircraft fuel tanks that resist rupture), emergency response
(e.g., air crew able to evacuate the plane quickly and to do so not into the fire or into the path of the fire
trucks), and rescue responses to minimise death (e.g., fire crews to quickly extinguish the fire, quick
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access to medical care for critically injured people). These actions happen poorly unless planned in a
systematic manner, the Pike River mine disaster being a case in point [5]. The recovery mechanisms
are also called barriers to the progression of the accident to a catastrophe. An effective methodology is
bowtie analysis.
We therefore propose that the risk treatments need to be more broadly considered than often
seems to be the case. We offer Figure 2 as a summary of the various treatment components.
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4.5. Adjustments to the Method for Safety Assessment
We suggest that in the type of legislative regime as ists i , it is necessary to mor explicitly
include the organisational interaction with the ore te strea s of risk a sessment. We
say this because it is the xecutives who personal y c r fi i l and criminal risks. Th refore,
it makes sense for rganisations to arrange their internal o r t reduce this risk.
Consequently, we propose some small modificati t t erall proce s of safety as essment.
These are relatively minor and more for emphasis that any substantive change to the ISO 310000 process.
We propose there are three work streams for an organisation. The initial management set-up activities
are to select appropriate consequence and likelihood scales, and identify the decision criteria. These
have been detailed above. Once decided, these do not have to be redefined for each case, but rather
they might become part of the standard operating procedures. Experience suggests that organisations
do tend to have standard consequence and likelihood scales, and hence this is a call to better align
those with the legislative requirements (per 4.1 above), and to more explicitly express the decision
criteria (per 4.3 above).
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It is proposed that the more technical work stream of risk assessment involves: Identify the system
architecture based on current state of plant or operations; Analyse hazards; Evaluate risks; Notify the
organisation so that executives are kept informed of risks to which the organisation is exposed; Devise
treatments, and Evaluate residual risk. The result of this process is the risk register, an example of
which is shown in Table 3. An example of the application is shown in Appendix A.
Table 3. Structure of the proposed risk register.
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in the integrated organisational processes. 
A third contribution is more subtle, in the inclusion of recovery thinking in the safety assessment 
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recovery mechanisms, and the modification to the conventional hierarchy of hazard control. The 
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In parallel, we anticipate a management work stream which identifies the scope of the assessment
in the first place. This might be in response to emergent or insufficiently controlled risks, changes in
external imposed regulations, or raised expectations based on how similar organisations are treating
their own risks. Importantly, in the eyes of the NZ law, it is also the responsibility of executives to
allocate resources to the treatments, keep themselves informed of risk status, and verify the efficacy
of treatments.
These proposed work streams and their interactions are shown in Figure 3.
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5. Discussion
5.1. Outcomes
This work makes several contributions. The first is developing a method to align safety assessments
towards a national legislative framework. The key components to achieving this are to align the harm
scale with the national definition of harm, creating a mechanism that links organisational risk appetite
to thresholds for management escalation, and providing organisational processes that integrate the
technical aspects of risk assessment with the management processes.
A second contribution is more explicitly including elements of systems engineering into the safety
assessment process. This is evident in the inclusion of a systems architecture perspective, and in the
integrated organisational processes.
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A third contribution is more subtle, in the inclusion of recovery thinking in the safety assessment
process. This is evident in the non-linearity of the harm scale, the decision criteria that call for
disaster recovery mechanisms, and the modification to the conventional hierarchy of hazard control.
The collective effect of these is intended to cause the analyst to be more mindful of the need not to stop
at mere preventative treatment. This has been achieved without burdening the process with the full
barrier/bowtie methodology. Hence, it is a subtle reframing of the process that has been achieved.
5.2. Implications for Practitioners
Practitioners are encouraged to make adjustments to their organisational risk assessment processes
to achieve better coherency with their national legislative frameworks. As each nation has its own
approach to H&S, some customisation of the method is naturally to be expected. The broader principles
are expected to be universally valid: Of aligning harm scales to legislative definitions of harm;
using systems thinking; incorporating recovery (barrier) thinking into treatments; and creating better
communication within the organisation about its risks. The existing safety assessment processes tend to
have a large ad hoc component, and the present work offers a mechanism to achieve greater coherence.
5.3. Limitations of the Work
The work is conceptual in nature, and hence the main limitation is that the efficacy of the method
has not been verified. It has not been tested with users.
The risk assessment method generally has many subjectivities, and the current approach shares
many of these. There is the subjectivity of what to include/exclude from the analysis in the first place
(which this method attempts to solve by requiring the system architecture to be described), how deeply
to identify risks, how to handle complex causal sequences, the ambiguity of what the words in the
scales mean, and the uncertainty of the residual risks after the treatments. To a great extent the choice
of which analysis method to use, (e.g., risk assessment, fault tree analysis, failure mode and effect
analysis, bowtie, etc.) constrains the way the analyst perceives the problem, and hence is another
source of subjectivity. In a perfect world all risks would be exactly qualified, but even the quantitative
methods often lack precise data and analysts are obliged to use estimates or heuristics, which are
also subjective. The point is that subjectivity exists in any method for analysing risks, and is not a
disqualifying factor per se. It seems more important to use a method well, and seek to minimise its
limitations. The ultimate objective is to continually improve safety outcomes, and the risk assessment
is a tool to achieve that rather than an end in itself.
5.4. Implications for Future Research
Organisations produce a large number of risk registers. It may be worth exploring how these are
communicated inside the organisation, and how they affect wider decision making. We suggest they
are a type of boundary object, and hence it may be interesting to examine them from a communication
theory perspective. It may also be interesting to examine organisational processes from a change
management perspective: how insights about risks might emerge in a bottom up process from the risk
assessments themselves, and the top down strategic processes too. It is apparent in many disaster
situations that organisations knew about the risks, at least in some part of the organisation, but failed
to communicate this or obtain sufficient resources to remedy the situation. We still see many cases
where the organisational response to risk failed. Thus, we suggest, the organisational behaviour work
streams are just as important as the technical aspects of risk assessment.
Construct validity is something that appears not to have been given much attention in the
qualitative risk assessment method. This can be an issue with both consequence and likelihood scales.
Do the terms actually mean the same for those providing the input data, as what the analyst assumes?
The harm scale proposed here avoids some of these issues by using the same terminology as in the NZ
Act. At least the scale is grounded on something that is nationally agreed, which is an improvement.
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There remains a residual ambiguity as to how that Act might be interpreted. It could be interesting to
see how consistent the semantic interpretations were between people.
6. Conclusions
The purpose of the work was to provide a standardised instrument for risk assessment that could
be used in the absence of any other more robust methods, and instead of the ad hoc constructs that
organisations may create in their attempt to meet the non-specific requirements of the legislative
frameworks. While the results given in this paper do not meet all the desirable attributes expressed in the
purpose statement, they do perhaps move the field forward towards a more possible future standardised
risk assessment instrument for H&S. In terms of the technical aspects of safety assessment, the method
provides an instrument that includes the various legal definitions of harm, accommodates the
non-linearity of catastrophic harm incidents, provides greater comparability between risk assessments,
and proposes the use of systems architecture to help guide the hazard identification process.
Regarding the management aspects, the approach embodies the concepts of organisational risk
appetite. It shows how thresholds may be defined to give clear expectations regarding treatment and
internal communication, thereby assisting executives (‘officers’ in terms of the NZ Act) meet their
duties. The provision of explicit prompts for communication within the organisation is a positive
feature as the literature shows such communication to be important for successful risk management. It
also supports the communication requirement in the NZ Act.
The method more explicitly prompts for recovery actions in the treatment plan (in addition to
preventative actions) for catastrophic risks.
This paper offers a conceptual method for aligning the safety assessment process to the national
H&S legislation, with New Zealand being the situation under examination.
In putting this method forward, the paper does not preclude the use of other methods. This
particular risk assessment approach may have merit for use by organisations that desire to improve
their management of H&S risks but are small, in developing nations, or in other ways lack resources to
develop their own methods.
Funding: This research received no external funding.
Conflicts of Interest: The author declares no conflict of interest.
Appendix A. Example Application of the Method
The method is illustrated by a representative study of a product development case. In this
hypothetical case, the firm is wanting to develop a new line of power tools. They have decided to start
by looking at the latest tool from competitors, and perform a risk assessment before commencing with
product design. In this way, they intend to include safety considerations at the earliest stage of the
development. The hardware architecture is shown in Figure A1, and the risk register in Table A1.
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Figure A1. Hardware architecture: For this product the functional sub-assemblies provide a useful 
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Figure A1. Hardware architecture: For this product the functional sub-assemblies provide a useful
categorisation of where the hazards emerge. The analysis includes areas where the operator’s body
parts contact the tool or are in line of sight of ejecta. This example is purely illustrative and does not
purport to be accurate or comprehensive. The residual risk after treatment has not been shown here,
but the principles are evident in Table 3.
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Table A1. Risk register for the scenario. This does not include the residual risks.
Risks of System in its CURRENT STATE, with Its Existing Controls. Angle Grinder with Operator Wearing Eye Protection and Hearing Protection
Architecture level: Work-stream, project
phase, hardware category, workstation
Specific hazard Consequence (C), as per
‘Severity of harm’ scale
Likelihood (L) of that
consequence arising
Risk Treatment? Consider Preventative and
Recovery mechanisms. (Controls)(C × L)
1. Hazard occurred 6 Almost certain 30 or higher Unacceptable risk.
2. Incident with no harm 5 Likely 18 or higher Urgent treatment.
3. Incident and
Minor harm 4 Possible 8 or higher Consider treatment
4. Incident and exposure
to serious harm 3 Unlikely 7 or less No intervention necessary.
5. Serious harm Occurs 2 Rare
8. Death 1 Almost incredible
10. Catastrophe
1 Cutting disk
Fixation fails 5 3
Design review to check reliability of
fixation between tool and cutting disk.
15 Warning in User instructions: Stop
operation if disk develops eccentricity.
Disk breaks free 5 2
Manufacturing defect of disk.
10 Warning in User instructions: Do not
use cracked or partially broken disks.
Disk fails and
breaks up 5 4 20
Poor quality of disk. Warning in User
instructions: Do not use cracked or
partially broken disks.
operator roll or yaw
of disk 5 4 20
Operator error. Warning in User
instructions: hold tool steady and
avoid bending the disk in the cutting
slot
Pieces of substrate
material break free 4 2 8
Situational error. Warning in User
instructions: No suitable for substrates
that have risk of breaking up.
wrong type disk
for substrate 4 4 16
Situational error. Warning in User
instructions: Use disk appropriate for
substrate
wrong size or speed 3 4 12
Operator error. Warning in User
instructions: Use disk maximum outer
diameter 120 mm.
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Table A1. Cont.
Risks of System in its CURRENT STATE, with Its Existing Controls. Angle Grinder with Operator Wearing Eye Protection and Hearing Protection
dust particles 5 5 25
Warning in User instructions: Use
respirator protection if dust or fumes
are produced.
sharp abraded edge 3 5 15
Warning in User instructions: Take care
when handling cutting disks as these
may have sharp edges or splinters.
splinters of
reinforcement 3 5 15
Warning in User instructions: Take care
when handling cutting disks as these
may have sharp edges or splinters
heat 3 5 15
Warning in User instructions: Take care
when handling cutting disks as these
may be hot.
2 Front handle
2.1 vibration 3 5 15 Warning in User instructions: Usegloves.
2.2 comes loose 4 3 12 Warning in User instructions: Ensurehandle is tight before using.
2.3 Hand slides
medially, contacts disk 5 5 25
Design handle with medial flange to
prevent hand migration.
3 Guard fails to protect eyes
3.1 not fitted 4 3 12
Warning in User instructions: Not
recommended to use without guard
fitted.
3.2.1 wrong position
due to operator error 4 3 12
Warning in User instructions: Ensure
guard is positioned to protect against
flying debris, and also not interfere
with the substrate.
3.2.2 wrong position
because too difficult to
adjust
4 5 20 Design guard to be easy to adjust andreposition securely, without tool.
3. loose 4 4 16 Ibid (design solution)
3.3.3 interferes with
substrate 2 6 12 Ibid (warning to secure)
4 Gearbox
4.1 noise 3 4 12 Already prevented with hearingprotection
4.2 vibration 3 4 12 Ibid (use gloves)
5 Motor body and trigger handle
5.1 noise 4 4 16 Ibid (hearing protection)
5.2 heat 3 2 6 Ibid (use gloves)
5.3 electric shock 5 2 10
5.4 fracture 4 3 12 Design housing for robustness
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Table A1. Cont.
Risks of System in its CURRENT STATE, with Its Existing Controls. Angle Grinder with Operator Wearing Eye Protection and Hearing Protection
6 Trigger
6.1 command error 5 5 25 Design trigger for usability. Includesafety interlock
6.2 ergonomics 4 3
Design padding into handle.
12 Ibid (use gloves)
7 Battery Power supply
7.1 fire 5 3 15 Design thermal cut-out into batteryelectronics
7.2 heat 3 6 18 Design thermal cut-out into batteryelectronics
7.3 electric shock 8 2 16 Design tool to operate on less than30VDC
7.4 reverse polarity 2 3 6 Design electronics so that assemblyerrors are physically prevented.
8 Charging station
8.1 fire 8 5 30 Design thermal cut-out into chargerelectronics
8.2 electric shock 8 4 24
Design double insulated charging
station, no external metal parts that are
easily accessible, charging pins to be
difficult to reach even accidentally
9 Disk changing tool
9.1 left attached and
flung off 5 3 15
Design tool to be loose fit so it will not
stay attached.
9.2 lost so disk not
attached properly 4 5 20
Design tool out altogether.
Alternatively provide a means to retain
it with the tool.
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